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THE PROPRIETY OF HEARING RAILWAY LABOR
GRIEVANCES AND FAIR REPRESENTATION
CLAIMS IN FEDERAL COURT
INTRODUCTION
Recently, railroad employees with grievances against their carrier-
employers and fair representation suits against their unions have at-
tempted to bypass the adjudication of the National Railroad Adjust-
ment Board (NRAB) I by bringing both claims in federal court.2 The
courts generally refuse to hear the grievances against carrier-employ-
ers3 because of well-established precedent granting the NRAB exclu-
sive jurisdiction over these claims. 4 The Supreme Court, however, to
assure a plaintiff-employee a fair hearing, has created an exception to
the NRAB's exclusive jurisdiction.5 It is now recognized that an
employee with a fair representation suit against a union and a griev-
ance against an employer may pursue both claims in federal court if
bringing the grievance to the Board would prove futile.(
1. 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1976).
2. Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 393 U.S. 324, 325-26 (1969); Raus v.
Brotherhood of Ry. Carmen, 663 F.2d 791, 796-97 (8th Cir. 1981); McKinney v.
International Ass'n of Machinists, 624 F.2d 745, 747-48 (6th Cir. 1980); Richins v.
Southern Pac. Co., 620 F.2d 761, 761-62 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1110 (1981); Franklin v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 593 F.2d 899, 901 (9th Cir.
1979) (per curiam); Price v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 586 F.2d 750, 751-52 (9th
Cir. 1978); Goclowski v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 571 F.2d 747, 754-56 (3d Cir.
1977); Harrison v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558, 559 (4th Cir. 1975) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976); Schum v. South Buffalo Ry., 496 F.2d
328, 329 (2d Cir. 1974); O'Mara v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 407 F.2d 674, 676-77 (2d
Cir. 1969), af'd sub nom. Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970); Connor v. Brother-
hood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 496 F. Supp. 154, .155 (M.D. Pa. 1980); James v.
Union Pac. R.R., 93 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2857, 2857 (D. Neb. 1976); Sisson v. Atchison
T. & S.F. Ry., 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3673, 3674 (D. Kan. 1976); Horton v. United
Transp. Union, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3546, 3547 (S.D. Ga. 1976).
3. E.g., Raus v. Brotherhood Ry. Carmen, 663 F.2d 791, 798-99 (8th Cir.
1981); McKinney v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 624 F.2d 745, 747-48 (6th Cir.
1980); Franklin v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 593 F.2d 899, 901-02 (9th Cir. 1979)
(per curiam); Goclowski v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 571 F.2d 747, 754-55 (3d Cir.
1978); James v. Union Pac. R.R., 93 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2857, 2859 (D. Neb. 1976);
Horton v. United Transp. Union, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3546, 3547 (S.D. Ga. 1976).
4. Raus v. Brotherhood Ry. Carmen, 663 F.2d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 1981);
McKinney v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 624 F.2d 745, 748 (6th Cir. 1980);
Franklin v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 593 F.2d 899, 902 (9th Cir. 1979) (per
curiam); Goclowski v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 571 F.2d 747, 755 (3d Cir. 1977); see
James v. Union Pac. R.R., 93 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2857, 2859 (D. Neb. 1976); Horton v.
United Transp. Union, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3546, 3547 (S.D. Ga. 1976).
5. Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 393 U.S. 324, 328-29 (1969).
6. Id. at 330-31; Schum v. South Buffalo Ry., 496 F.2d 328, 330 (2d Cir. 1974);
Smith v. B & 0 R.R., 473 F. Supp. 572, 578 (D. Md. 1979); see Raus v. Brotherhood
Ry. Carmen, 663 F.2d 791, 797-98 (8th Cir. 1981); Richins v. Southern Pac. Co.,
620 F.2d 761, 762-63 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1110 (1981).
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The scope of the Supreme Court's futility exception, however, is
unclear, leading to confusion in the lower courts.7  Although their
interpretations of the exception vary, courts are uniform in adopting a
restrictive approach toward hearing an employee's claims against
both employer and union." This Note examines these court decisions
and contends that the consideration underlying the futility exception,
that of a fair trial, is not properly addressed by lower courts. Ade-
quate protection of an employee's right to a fair hearing mandates
that in every instance when he alleges a grievance against his em-
ployer and a breach of the duty of fair representation against his
union, the two actions should be heard in federal court.
I. THE NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BoARD
In 1934, Congress amended the Railway Labor Act (RLA)9 and
created the NRAB.10 The purpose of the Board is to provide final
7. The minority view allows into federal court those claims that do not involve
contractual interpretation. Goclowski v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 571 F.2d 747, 756-
57 (3d Cir. 1977); Connor v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 496 F. Supp.
154, 157 (M.D. Pa. 1980). The majority of courts accept jurisdiction when collusion
between union and carrier is alleged. Raus v. Brotherhood Ry. Carmen, 663 F.2d
791, 798 (8th Cir. 1981); Richins v. Southern Pac. Co., 620 F.2d 761, 762-63 (10th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1110 (1981); Price v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co.,
586 F.2d 750, 752 (9th Cir. 1978); O'Mara v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 407 F.2d 674,
679 (2d Cir. 1969), aff'd sub nom. Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 295 (1970); Smith v. B
& 0 R.R., 473 F. Supp. 572, 578 (D. Md. 1979); see Harrison v. United Transp.
Union, 530 F.2d 558, 562-63 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958
(1976).
8. See infra notes 43-74 and accompanying text.
9. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976). The RLA incorporated past railroad practices
and parts of prior legislation in an attempt to maintain peace and stability in the
railway industry. Union Pac. R.R. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 94 (1978) (per curiam);
Union Pac. R.R. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601, 609 (1959); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen
v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 290 F.2d 266, 268 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 966 (1961). The Act mandated mediation as the primary means of resolving
labor disputes, and urged voluntary arbitration if this method should fail. National
Mediation Board, Administration of the Railway Labor Act 21 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Administration of the RLA]; Risher, The Railway Labor Act, 12 B.C. Indus.
& Com. L. Rev. 51, 58, 60 (1970). In addition, the RLA provided for the establish-
ment of local and regional adjustment boards to interpret and apply railroad labor
agreements. Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, § 3, 44 Stat. 577, 578 (1926) (current
version at 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1976)); accord Union Pac. R.R. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601,
609 (1959).
10. 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1976). After a dispute is processed through a railroad's local
grievance machinery, it may be appealed by either party to the appropriate division
of the NRAB. Id. § 153 First (i) (1976); see Union Pac. R.R. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601,
604 (1959). The NRAB never acts as a unit, but operates instead as four separate
divisions, each one responsible for overseeing designated areas of employment within
the railway industry. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (h) (1976); accord Administration of the
RLA, supra note 9, at 82. The Board is composed of 34 members, representing in
equal numbers, carriers and unions. Id. at 82-83.
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disposition" of all "minor disputes"' 2-- those "growing out of griev-
ances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements con-
cerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions."' 3  In requiring
11. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (m) (1976); see Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 373 U.S. 33, 38-39 (1963); Union Pac. R.R. v. Price, 360 U.S.
601, 613-14 (1959); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R.,
353 U.S. 30, 34 (1957). The Amendment provided that NRAB awards "shall be final
and binding upon both parties to the dispute, except insofar as they shall contain a
money award." Railway Labor Act, ch. 691, § 3 First (m), 48 Stat. 1189, 1191 (1934)
(emphasis added) (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (m) (1976)). In 1965, the
Supreme Court, in Gunther v. San Diego & A.E. Ry., 382 U.S. 257 (1965), held that
an NRAB decision should not be reviewable merely because part of it involved a
money award. Id. at 264. A year later, Congress retracted the exception in the
statute; all awards are now final. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (m) (1976).
12. Union Pac. R.R. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 94 (1978); Gunther v. San Diego &
A.E. Ry., 382 U.S. 257, 261 (1965); Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711,
723-24 (1945), aff'd on rehearing, 327 U.S. 661 (1946); Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co.
v. United Transp. Union, 656 F.2d 274, 278 (7th Cir. 1981); McKinney v. Interna-
tional Ass'n of Machinists, 624 F.2d 745, 748 (6th Cir. 1980). The amendment also
abolished the United States Board of Mediation, which had been created by the 1926
Act, and established in its stead the National Mediation Board (NMB). 45 U.S.C. §§
154-155 (1976). The NMB mediates "major disputes"-those "concerning changes in
rates of pay, rules, or working conditions not adjusted by the parties," id. § 155 First
(a), and "[a]ny other dispute not referable to the [NRAB]." Id. § 155 First (b); accord
Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 148, 149
n.14 (1969); Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722-23 (1945), aff'd on
rehearing, 327 U.S. 661 (1946). If the NMB is unsuccessful at resolving a major
dispute, the parties may consent to voluntary arbitration. 45 U.S.C. § 155 First (b)
(1976). "If one party declines arbitration, however, then, unless the President of the
United States creates an emergency board to investigate the dispute, either party can
resort to self-help, including, for the union, a strike." St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. United
Transp. Union, 646 F.2d 230, 231 (5th Cir. 1981). Parties with "minor" disputes,
however, may not resort to self-help. Id. at 231-32; see Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v.
Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 725 (1945), aff'd on rehearing, 327 U.S. 661 (1946).
13. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i) (1976). Two major flaws became evident in the
provision of the original RLA, which called for local and regional adjustment boards.
Northrup, The Railway Labor Act: A Critical Reappraisal, 25 Indus. & Lab. Rel.
Rev. 3, 4 (1971); Risher, supra note 9, at 71; Seidenberg, Grievance Adjustment in
the Railroad Industry, in The Railway Labor Act at Fifty 209, 209-12 (C. Rehmus
ed. 1976). First, establishment of these boards and adherence to their authority were
on a consensual basis only. Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, § 3, 44 Stat. 577, 578 (1926)
(current version at 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1976)). Consequently, the parties often encoun-
tered difficulty in both setting up the adjustment boards, and once established,
enforcing their decisions. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind.
R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1957); H.R. Rep. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934),
reprinted in Senate Subcomm. on Labor, Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of the Railway Labor Act, As Amended 1355
(Comm. Print 1974). Second, the statute provided no effective method for breaking
the deadlocks which often resulted on these structurally bipartisan boards. Union
Pac. R.R. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601, 610 (1959); Garrison, The National Railroad
Adjustment Board: A Unique AdministrativeAgency, 46 Yale L.J., 567, 574 (1937);
Seidenberg, supra, at 212; see Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 725-26
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equal representation of carriers and unions on the NRAB,' 4 Congress
recognized that frequent deadlocks would occur.Is To protect against
such eventuality, Congress provided that a neutral referee be ap-
pointed to reach a decision when the Board is unable to secure a
majority vote.' 6
The Adjustment Board is unique in United States labor law. It is
"the only administrative tribunal, federal or state, which has ever
been set up in this country for the purpose of rendering judicially
enforceable decisions in controversies arising out of the interpretation
of contracts."17 In contrast, employers of industries governed by the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)18 are required to bargain dis-
putes with employees, but there is no compulsion or even a prescribed
method for finalizing these grievances.19
(1945), aff'd on rehearing, 327 U.S. 661 (1946). The 1934 amendment was designed
to eliminate both these shortcomings. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago
River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 36-37 (1957); Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325
U.S. 711, 727-28 (1945), aff'd on rehearing, 327 U.S. 661 (1946).
14. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (a) (1976). To qualify for representation on the Board,
the union had to be "national in scope." Id.
15. S. Rep. No. 1065, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934). reprinted in Senate Sub-
comm. on Labor, Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Legisla-
tive History of the Railway Labor Act, As Amended 821 (Comm. Print 1974); see
Union Pac. R.R. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601, 610-13 (1959); Brotherhood of R.R. Train-
men v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 36-37 (1957).
16. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First () (1976). The statute provides that the division
hearing the grievance select the referee. In instances where the division cannot agree
on an appointment within 10 days following the deadlock, the division must turn to
the NMB, which is then responsible for the appointment of a referee. Id.
17. Garrison, supra note 13, at 567; accord Risher, supra note 9, at 71.
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1976). The NLRA is the primary body of law govern-
ing labor relations in private industry. R. Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law:
Unionization and Collective Bargaining ch. 1, at 1 (1976). It was enacted in several
parts over the period 1935-1959 and was "an effort by the Congress to create the
conditions of industrial peace in interstate commerce by removing obstacles to-
indeed, encouraging-the formation of labor unions as an effective voice for the
individual worker." Id.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976); accord H.K. Porter Co., Disston Div.-Danville
Works v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 106 (1970); McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600
F.2d 1193, 1201 (6th Cir. 1979); Wal-lite Div. of U.S. Gypsum Co. v. NLRB, 484
F.2d 108, 111 (8th Cir. 1973); see R. Gorman, supra note 18, ch. 19, § 5, at 393;
Risher, supra note 9, at 71 n.70. The favored method for settling grievances, how-
ever, is through "final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties." Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976); accord United Steelworkers
of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 565, 566 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am.
v. Warriers & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960); United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960). Accordingly, most
collective bargaining contracts provide for the resolution of grievances through inter-
nal machinery, culminating in voluntary arbitration. R. Gorman, supra note 18, ch.
23, § 3, at 544.
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If a carrier does not comply with an NRAB decision within a
specified time, a grievant may file a petition in district court; 20 the
court is then empowered to enforce the Adjustment Board's order. 2 1
In contrast to this unrestricted power to enforce an NRAB order,
however, a court's power to review an NRAB decision is severely
limited.2 2 Judicial review is permitted "for Failure of the division to
comply with the requirements [of the RLA,] for failure of the order to
conform, or confine itself, to matters within the scope of the division's
jurisdiction, or for fraud or corruption by a member of the division
making the order. ' 2 3 In addition, Board decisions are reviewable if
they are violative of due process.2 4
The Board was created with the power to hear grievances brought
by either the employee's representative-the union-or the employee
20. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (p) (1976).
21. Southern Pac. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen,
393 F.2d 345, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968); see 45 U.S.C.
§ 153 First (p) (1976).
22. Union Pac. R.R. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 91 (1978) (per curiam); Del Casal
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 634 F.2d 295, 298 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W.
3278 (Oct. 13, 1981); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 580 F.2d
169, 172 (5th Cir. 1978); Diamond v. Terminal Ry. Ala. State Docks, 421 F.2d 228,
233 (5th Cir. 1970); James v. Union Pac. R.R., 93 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2857, 2858 (D.
Neb. 1976). Before 1966, a carrier could refuse to comply with an award granted to
an employee, and the employee's only remedy was to retry the case in court. If,
however, the employee lost his case before the Board, there was no judicial review
available to him. H.R. Rep. No. 1114, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15, reprinted in
Senate Subcomm. on Labor, Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess., Legislative History of the Railway Labor Act, As Amended 1321 (Comm. Print
1974). The 1966 Amendments added a section that afforded an equal degree of
review to both parties. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (p) (1976).
23. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (q) (1976). Courts adhere strictly to this standard. The
Supreme Court has stated: "We have time and again emphasized that this statutory
language means just what it says." Union Pac. R.R. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 93
(1978) (per curiam); accord Skidmore v. Consolidated Rail, 619 F.2d 157, 159 (2d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 854 (1980); Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. v.
Blackett, 538 F.2d 291, 293 (10th Cir. 1976); Roberts v. Lehigh Coal & Navigation
Co., 497 F. Supp. 56, 58 (E.D. Pa. 1979). The Board's "order can be reversed by the
courts if it is found to be 'actually and undisputably without foundation in reason or
fact' or 'wholly baseless and without reason.' " Kotakis v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry., 520
F.2d 570, 574 (7th Cir.) (citations omitted) (quoting Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen
v. Central of Ga. Ry., 415 F.2d 403, 414 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1008
(1970); Gunther v. San Diego & A.E. Ry., 382 U.S. 257, 261 (1965)), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1016 (1975).
24. O'Neill v. Public Law Bd. No. 550, 581 F.2d 692, 694 (7th Cir. 1978);
Kotakis v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry., 520 F.2d 570, 574 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S.
1016 (1975); Rosen v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 400 F.2d 462, 464 (5th Cir. 1968) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 959 (1969); Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way
Employees v. St. Johnsbury & Lamoille Cty. R.R., 512 F. Supp. 1079, 1084 (D. Vt.
1981); Consolidated Rail v. Delaware & Hudson Ry., 499 F. Supp. 967, 971 (E.D.
Pa. 1980).
RAILWAY LABOR GRIEVANCES
himself.2 5 The vast majority of cases, however, are brought by the
unions;2 6 an individual is unlikely to be as successful in front of the
Board as is his better-equipped and more experienced representa-
tive.27 It is settled law that jurisdiction of the Board is exclusive; the
NRAB is the employee's sole forum for resolving any minor disputes he
may have with his carrier-employer. 2 In contrast, the Board has no
authority to hear breach of fair representation claims against un-
ions.2 9 Employees must bring these complaints in federal court.
When an employee brings a claim against both his employer and
union, however, a problem arises as to the proper forum for resolving
the conflict. The established rules dictate that such a suit be bifur-
25. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i)-(j) (1976); see Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 327
U.S. 661, 666 (1946); O'Mara v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 407 F.2d 674, 678 (2d Cir.
1969), af'd sub nom. Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970); Pacilio v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 381 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1967). This right accorded to individuals does not,
however, excuse the union from its duty of fair representation. Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957); O'Mara v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 407 F.2d 674, 678 (2d Cir.
1969), aff'd sub nor. Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970).
26. Seidenberg, supra note 13, at 236. In 1975, of 930 cases submitted to the First
division of the Board, 37 were filed by individuals. Id.
27. E.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); Schum v. South Buffalo Ry.,
496 F.2d 328, 331 (2d Cir. 1974); O'Mara v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 407 F.2d 674,
678 (2d Cir. 1969), affd sub nor. Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970); Hennebury
v. Transport Workers Union, 485 F. Supp. 1319, 1324 (D. Mass. 1980).
28. Union Pac. R.R. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 94 (1978) (per curiam); Clover v.
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 393 U.S. 324, 328 (1969); Raus v. Brotherhood Ry.
Carmen, 663 F.2d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 1981); McKinney v. International Ass'n of
Machinists, 624 F.2d 745, 748 (6th Cir. 1980); Richins v. Southern Pac. Co., 620
F.2d 761, 762 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1110 (1981). The courts were
initially reluctant to grant exclusive jurisdiction to the Adjustment Board. In 1941,
the Supreme Court ruled that exhaustion of administrative remedies was merely an
RLA alternative to judicial proceedings, not a requirement. Moore v. Illinois Cent.
R.R., 312 U.S. 630, 635-36 (1941). The Moore Court also held that claims for
unlawful discharge were subject to state law and were therefore immune to the
requirement of exhaustion before the NRAB. Id. at 634. A later case repudiated both
holdings, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago Riv. & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30,
39 (1957), and Moore was finally overruled by Andrews v. Louisville & N.R.R., 406
U.S. 320, 326 (1972). "[T]he notion that the grievance and arbitration procedures
provided for minor disputes in the [RLA] are optional, to be availed of as the
employee or the carrier chooses, was never good history and is no longer good law."
Id. at 322.
29. Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1970); Glover v. St. Louis-San Fran-
cisco Ry., 393 U.S. 324, 328 (1969); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 44-45 (1957);
Raus v. Brotherhood Ry. Carmen, 663 F.2d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 1981); Richins v.
Southern Pac. Co., 620 F.2d 761, 763 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1110
(1981). The statutory duty of fair representation was first enunciated in Steele v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 199 (1944). This doctrine provides that a union is
obligated to "serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination
toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to
avoid arbitrary conduct." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967); accord Humphrey
v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342 (1964).
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cated, the dispute with the union being heard in federal court, and the
grievance against the railroad being sent back to the NRAB. 30 In
Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway,31 however, the Supreme
Court held that when an employee brings a claim alleging joint
discrimination by his union and employer, the entire case is properly
heard in federal court. 32 The question left unanswered by Glover is
whether a court will hear a grievance against an employer along with
a breach of fair representation claim against a union if the two claims,
while independent, arise from the same set of facts.
II. Glover AND THE IMPROPER APPROACH OF THE LowER COURTS
In Glover, a group of black employees claimed that they were the
victims of a tacit discriminatory agreement between their employer
and union to deny them promotions in violation of the collective
bargaining agreement.3 3 The plaintiffs claimed that they had pre-
sented their grievance to union and company representatives on sev-
eral occasions, but at best had been ignored, and at worst rebuffed
and taunted.3 4
The Supreme Court first noted that a suit against the union does not
fall within the jurisdiction of the NRAB. 35 Furthermore, because the
grievance involved "employees on the one hand and the union and
management together on the other ...the [Adjustment Board had]
no power to order the kind of relief necessary even with respect to the
railroad alone, in order to end entirely abuses of the sort alleged."30
The joint discrimination, coupled with the employees' unsuccessful
attempts to present their claims to both the employer and the union,
created a situation in which any attempt to pursue remedies from
representatives of the very organizations being sued would most likely
meet with failure. 37  The Court, therefore, allowed federal court
30. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. Under the NLRA, an em-
ployee is permitted to join his employer and union in a suit in federal court. Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 187 (1967); Geddes v. Chrysler Corp., 608 F.2d 261, 265 (6th
Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Local 485, Int'l Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers,
AFL-CIO, 454 F.2d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 1972).
31. 393 U.S. 324 (1969).
32. Id. at 328-29.
33. Id. at 325-27. There were also five white plaintiffs. Id.
34. Id. at 326-27.
35. Id. at 328-29.
36. Id. at 329.
37. Id. at 331. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), was cited In
Glover. 393 U.S. at 329. Steele is a landmark case most noted for holding that unions
are obligated to represent all employees in a non-discriminatory fashion. 323 U.S. at
198-99. More relevant here, however, is Steele's discussion of why the black plaintiff
in that case could not be successful in a suit brought before the NRAB. First, at that
time the Board consistently refused to hear claims brought by individuals. Id. at 205.
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jurisdiction over both union and railroad. 38
Prior to Glover, an employee could bring a grievance against his
employer to federal court only when the actions of either the employer
or the union effectively precluded the employee from seeldng relief
through administrative procedures. 39 The exception in Glover fur-
ther relaxed the restriction on the employee's access to the federal
courts. An employee with claims against his employer and union can
now bring both defendants to court "where the effort to proceed
formally with contractual or administrative remedies would be
wholly futile." 40 Futility requires something less than the earlier
exception of effective preclusion: Although an employee might not be
precluded from bringing his claim to the NRAB, his attempt to pro-
cure a fair hearing could still be futile. The futility standard, how-
ever, has proved to be problematic. The Glover Court declined to
afford the standard a clear definition, and a subsequent Supreme
Court case expressly avoided the issue. 4' Lower courts have not
"Further, since § 3 First (c) permits the national labor organizations chosen by the
majority of the crafts to 'prescribe the rules under which the labor members of the
Adjustment Board shall be selected' and to 'select such members and designate the
division on which each member shall serve,' [the plaintiffs] would be required to
appear before a group which is in large part chosen by the [defendants] against
whom their real complaint is made." Id. at 206. The Glover court relied on this
discussion in concluding that it would be unfair to affirm the dismissals of the lower
courts. 393 U.S. at 330-31.
38. 393 U.S. at 329. In so doing, the Supreme Court reversed two lower court
decisions. The district court had dismissed the case, citing plaintiffs' failure to ex-
haust the remedies provided by the collective bargaining agreement and by the
NRAB. Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R., No. 65-477, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Ala.
July 28, 1966), af'd per curiam, 386 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1967), revd, 393 U.S. 324
(1969). Responding to plaintiffs' argument that these remedies were inadequate
because of the nature of their complaint, the court stated that, -[t]o indulge such a
presupposition would be to sterilize procedures adopted to promote industrial
peace." Id. The court of appeals affirmed the ruling. 386 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1967)
(per curiam), rev'd, 393 U.S. 324 (1969).
39. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185 (1967). In Vaca, a case not brought under
the RLA, the Court spoke of this exception as arising under two situations. The first is
when the employer repudiates the grievance procedures by its own wrongful actions.
The second is when the union has the "sole power ... to invoke the higher stages of
the grievance procedure, and . . .prevent[s the plaintiff] from exhausting his con-
tractual remedies by [its] wrongful refusal to process the grievance." Id.
40. Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 393 U.S. 324, 330 (1969).
41. Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 29-30 (1970). In Czosek, the plaintiff had
brought suit against his carrier-employer for wrongful discharge and against his
union for breach of its duty of fair representation. O'Mara v. Erie Lackawanna R.R.,
407 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1969), aff'd sub nom. Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25
(1970). The court of appeals reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint
against the union, id. at 679, but the dismissal of the complaint against the carrier
was upheld, with the provision that the plaintiffs could amend their complaint to
allege participation of the railroad in the union's action. Id. at 676. The employees
did not appeal the Second Circuit decision, and thus the Supreme Court had "no
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established a uniform interpretation of the futility exception. 42
A minority of the lower courts recognize that the Glover holding
establishes an exception to accepted jurisdictional rules. 43 In defining
that exception, however, the minority seemingly creates another
standard, independent of futility: A court may accept jurisdiction
over both defendants only when the suit is primarily against the union
and does not involve the interpretation of the underlying collective
bargaining agreement. 44  Those claims that do require contractual
interpretation are returned to the Board. 45
In Goclowski v. Penn Central Transportation Co.,4° for example,
plaintiffs claimed that their employer and union had entered into a
merger agreement in violation of the seniority rights afforded employ-
ees by a collective bargaining agreement. 47 Plaintiffs contested the
merger agreement on two distinct grounds. 48 The employees first
alleged that the agreement was an unlawful extension of the collective
bargaining agreement. 49 The Circuit Court refused jurisdiction on
this portion of the suit, stating: "No doubt may be entertained that
this claim requires close examination of the pertinent collective bar-
gaining agreements between the Union and the Railroad. We defer to
occasion to consider whether under federal law . . . the employer may always be
sued with the union when a single series of events gives rise to claims against the
employer for breach of contract and against the union for breach of the duty of fair
representation or whether, as the Court of Appeals held, when there are no allega-
tions tying union and employer together, the union is suable in the District Court for
breach of duty but resort must be had to the Adjustment Board for a remedy against
the employer." 397 U.S. at 29-30. The Court did hold that union defendants could be
sued alone for breach of their duty and that they would be held liable only for the
damage they caused. Id. at 28-29.
42. See infra notes 43-74 and accompanying text. Compare Raus v. Brotherhood
Ry. Carmen, 663 F.2d 791, 798-99 (8th Cir. 1981) (Glover applicable when collusion
exists between defendants), with Goclowski v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 571 F.2d
747, 756 n.13 (3d Cir. 1977) (Glover not applicable "when the basis of the claim is
primarily construction and interpretation of existing collective bargaining agree-
ments").
43. Goclowski v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 571 F.2d 747, 756 n.13 (3d Cir.
1977); Connor v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 496 F. Supp. 154, 157
n.3 (M.D. Pa. 1980).
44. Goclowski v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 571 F.2d 747, 756-57 (3d Cir. 1977);
see Connor v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 496 F. Supp. 154, 157(M.D. Pa. 1980).
45. Goclowski v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 571 F.2d 747, 755-57 (3d Cir. 1977);
Connor v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 496 F. Supp. 154, 157 (M.D.
Pa. 1980).
46. 571 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1977).
47. Id. at 750-51.




the expertise of the Board in construing the railroad labor con-
tracts."' s The court thus returned the claim to the NRAB. 5'
The employees then argued that the failure to obtain employee
ratification before the contract was adopted rendered the agreement
invalid.52  The court stated that this portion of the suit primarily
involved employees and their union, and therefore could not properly
be heard by the NRAB. s3 The court thus exercised jurisdiction over
both the union and the railroad, reasoning that this claim did not
involve interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement but rather
required the application of common-law principles with respect to the
formation of a contract. The expertise of the Board was, therefore, not
necessary, and the defendants were properly in court..
The majority of courts, however, do not look to whether the dispute
involves interpretation of an underlying collective bargaining agree-
ment. These courts, in recognizing the propriety of the futility excep-
tion, 55 deem futility satisfied, and the entire case properly heard in
court, when it is alleged that the union and employer acted collusively
to deny an employee his rights.56 Conversely, when no such collusion
is alleged, the suit against the union should be tried in court, but the
employee's related dispute with his employer must be returned to the
Board. The requirement of collusion, however, fails to further clarify
the futility exception. The majority of courts have not articulated the
50. Id. at 755. The court explicitly stated that it did not recognize Glovefs
applicability to a suit that involves contractual interpretation. Id. at 756 n. 13. Other
courts have criticized Goclowski's interpretation of Glover. Raus v. Brotherhood Ry.
Carmen, 663 F.2d 791, 798 (8th Cir. 1981); Richins v. Southern Pac. Co., 620 F.2d
761, 763 n.3 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1110 (1981).
51. 571 F.2d at 755.
52. Id. at 753.
53. Id. at 755-56. The court cited Glover for its similar facts. Id. at 756.
54. Id. Applying the rationale that the primary claim was against the union, the
court then accepted jurisdiction over a claim that the union and railroad had con-
spired to breach a duty of fair representation by failing to obtain ratification for the
contract. Id. at 759.
55. See Raus v. Brotherhood Ry. Carmen, 663 F.2d 791, 797-98 (8th Cir. 1981);
Richins v. Southern Pac. Co., 620 F.2d 761, 762-63 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1110 (1981); Price v. Southern Pae. Transp. Co., 586 F.2d 750, 751-52 (9th
Cir. 1978); Harrison v. United Transp. Union. 530 F.2d 558, 562-63 (4th Cir. 1975)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976); O'Mara v. Erie Lackawanna R.R.,
407 F.2d 674, 679 (2d Cir. 1969), affd sub nom. Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25
(1970); Smith v. B & 0 R.R., 473 F. Supp. 572, 578 (D. Md. 1979).
56. Raus v. Brotherhood Ry. Carmen, 663 F.2d 791, 798 (8th Cir. 1981); Richins
v. Southern Pac. Co., 620 F.2d 761, 762 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1110
(1981); Price v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 586 F.2d 750, 752 (9th Cir. 1978);
O'Mara v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 407 F.2d 674, 679 (2d Cir. 1969), affd sub nom.
Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970); Smith v. B & 0 R.R., 473 F. Supp. 572, 578
(D. Md. 1979); see Harrison v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558, 562-63 (4th Cir.
1975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976).
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elements necessary to find collusion, but an analysis of the relevant
cases reveals that such clarification is not necessary. Courts have
exercised jurisdiction over a defendant railroad only if the union has
effectively precluded the employee from bringing an action to the
NRAB. 57 The courts are thus adhering to the narrower exception that
was established prior to Glover while virtually ignoring that of futil-
ity.
In Richins v. Southern Pacific Co.,-5 for example, the Tenth Circuit
held that for an employee to bring both actions before the court, "the
alleged facts, viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, [must be]
consistent with a pattern of collusion between Union and Rail-
road." 59  Having found that the requirement was met, the court
accepted jurisdiction over both union and railroad defendants. 0° The
facts of the case, however, while not indicating what collusive activity
actually occurred, did reveal the consequences of that activity. In
Richins, the employer had violated its contract with plaintiffs by
awarding seniority rights to workers of a merging railroad.01 Plain-
tiffs brought their complaint to the union. Instead of protecting their
rights, however, the union consistently misled plaintiff-employees02
57. Richins v. Southern Pac. Co., 620 F.2d 761, 762 & n.2 (10th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1110 (1981); Schum v. South Buffalo Ry., 496 F.2d 328, 332 (2d
Cir. 1974); Sisson v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3673, 3674 (D.
Kan. 1976); see James v. Union Pac. R.R., 93 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2857, 2859 (D. Neb.
1976); cf. Harrison v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558, 560-61 (4th Cir. 1975)
(per curiam) (court refused to exercise jurisdiction over the railroad even though the
union's wrongful action had prevented plaintiff from filing a grievance with the
Board), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976). When the element of effective preclusion
by the union is not present, but collusion is alleged, courts do not hear the case
against the railroad. Raus v. Brotherhood Ry. Carmen, 663 F.2d 791, 798 (8th Cir.
1981); McKinney v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 624 F.2d 745, 747 (6th Cir.
1980); Horton v. United Transp. Union, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3546, 3546-47 (S.D.
Ga. 1976); cf. O'Mara v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 407 F.2d 674, 679 (2d Cir. 1969),
aff'd sub nom. Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970) (complaint against union
reinstated with leave to plaintiffs to amend their complaint to allege collusion
between defendants). But see Price v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 586 F.2d 750, 754
(9th Cir. 1978) (court exercised jurisdiction over claims against union and railroad
but then dismissed both cases on summary judgment).
58. 620 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1110 (1981).
59. Id. at 762. The court considered two other factors in reaching its conclusion.
First, it expressed concern that the plaintiff might not be able to obtain complete
relief in court if the railroad were not a party, because he was requesting reinstate-
ment with seniority. Second, a bifurcated proceeding would constitute a waste of
judicial resources and could lead to inconsistent results. Id. at 762-63.
60. Id. at 763.
61. Id. at 761-62. The claim originated from the dovetailing of two seniority
rosters following the merger of two railroads. Plaintiffs alleged they were demoted
several times, and finally furloughed, while workers who should have been demoted
first according to contract, were retained in their original positions. Id. at 762.




and effectively precluded them from filing a timely claim against the
railroad with the NRAB. 3 Under these circumstances, it would not
merely have been futile for plaintiffs to bring their grievance to the
Board; it would have been impossible. The court, therefore, agreed to
hear these claims, not because the union conspired in any way with
the railroad to deprive these plaintiffs of their rights, but because the
union's wrongful actions forced the plaintiffs to seek relief in court.
A comparison of Raus v. Brotherhood Railway Carmen64 with the
Richins decision confirms that the majority of courts are in fact apply-
ing the effective preclusion standard in determining whether to bifur-
cate the employee's claim against employer and union. The Raus
court, like the court in Richins, required collusion but failed to define
it.65 Furthermore, the facts of the two cases are strildngly similar. In
both, plaintiffs claimed that their employer had violated a collective
bargaining agreement, and that subsequently, the union had failed to
represent them in their claim.6 6 Unlike Richins, however, the union's
activities in Raus did not prevent plaintiffs from filing a claim with
the NRAB. Thus, the Raus court concluded that the claims should be
bifurcated.67 Presumably, if the plaintiffs had been precluded from
bringing their claim to the Board, the court would have reached an
opposite conclusion.
The effective preclusion standard implicit in the holdings in Richins
and Raus was explicitly enunciated by the Second Circuit in Schum v.
South Buffalo Railway.68  In this case, there was no discussion of
collusion. Rather, the court looked to the effect of the union's activi-
ties on the employee's ability to pursue his claim in front of the
63. Id. at 762 & n.2.
64. 663 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1981).
65. Compare id. at 798 ("good faith allegations and facts supporting those allega-
tions indicating collusion"), with Richins v. Southern Pac. Co., 620 F.2d 761, 762
(10th Cir. 1980) ("alleged facts, viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiffs', are
consistent with a pattern of collusion"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1110 (1981).
66. Compare Raus v. Brotherhood Ry. Carmen, 663 F.2d 791, 793 (8th Cir.
1981) (complaint alleged railroad had not allowed employees to enter an apprentice
training program and union had violated duty of fair representation by not enforcing
employees' rights), with Richins v. Southern Pac. Co., 620 F.2d 761, 761 (10th Cir.
1980) (complaint alleged that railroad layoffs violated collective bargaining agree-
ment and union violated duty of fair representation by failure to enforce the agree-
ment), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1110 (1981).
67. 663 F.2d at 799. In so doing, the court of appeals affirmed the lower court's
decision as to the railroad, but reversed the lower court's holding as to the union. Id.
The district court relied on Coclowski in stating that, because the primary cause of
action was against the railroad and the claim against the union arose as a result of the
primary claim, neither suit was properly in federal court. Raus v. Brotherhood Ry.
Carmen, 498 F. Supp. 1294, 1297-98 (S.D. Iowa 1980), afj'd in part, rev'd in part,
663 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1981). The court of appeals explicitly rejected this reasoning.
663 F.2d at 797.
68. 496 F.2d 328, 331-32 (2d Cir. 1974).
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Board.6 9 The court found that Schum had made a good faith attempt
to exhaust the contractual and administrative remedies of bringing the
suit before the NRAB.7° Because the union's activities had precluded
a Board hearing,7 1 however, Schum was entitled to his day in court
against both union and employer. 72
While the majority's effective preclusion standard and the minori-
ty's contractual interpretation standard represent distinct approaches
to the issue of court jurisdiction over controversies normally decided
by the Board, neither approach is broad enough to provide the em-
ployee with the protection contemplated by the Glover Court in
establishing its futility standard. The futility exception was created by
balancing the congressional preference for exclusive jurisdiction of the
Board 73 with the concern for providing a litigant with a fair opportu-
nity to be heard.74  The flaw in the lower courts' approaches is that
they fail to properly weigh these two considerations.
III. THE PROPER BALANCING OF THE CONCERNS
BEHIND THE FuriLITY EXCEPTION
In creating the NRAB, Congress recognized that to promote stabil-
ity in the railway industry, a forum was needed to provide efficient
and effective resolutions of management-labor disputes. 75  To best
69. Id. at 330-31. The court relied on both the futility and effective preclusion
exceptions in reaching its decision. See id.
70. Id. at 332.
71. Id. at 329-30. Schum had sustained injuries that the carrier claimed hindered
his ability to work. Several hearing dates were scheduled, but Schum notified his
employer that none of the dates were satisfactory to him, and failed to appear. He
was subsequently terminated for insurbordination. Id. at 329. Schum contacted his
union for aid. The union agreed to handle his complaint, but only completed the first
step of the grievance procedure; after presenting the complaint to a high-ranking
official of the railroad, the union failed to file a timely complaint with the NRAB. Id.
at 329-30.
72. Id. at 331-32.
73. 112 Cong. Rec. H2749 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1966) (statement of Rep. Younger),
reprinted in Senate Subcomm. on Labor, Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of the Railway Labor Act, As Amended 1355
(Comm. Print 1974); Note, Preemption Doctrine and Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies Doctrine Under the Railway Labor Act, 52 Temp. L.Q. 198, 208 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Preemption Doctrine]; see Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco
Ry., 393 U.S. 324, 330 (1969).
74. Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 393 U.S. 324, 329-30 (1969). The
Supreme Court adds the facts of Glover to the "line of cases [in which] the Court has
rejected the contention that employees alleging racial discrimination should be re-
quired to submit their controversy to 'a group which is in large part chosen by the
[defendants] against whom their real complaint is made.' " Id. at 330 (citations
omitted); see Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 205-06 (1944).
75. Union Pac. R.R. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 94 (1978) (per curiam); Gunther v.
San Diego & A.E. Ry., 382 U.S. 257, 263 (1965); Union Pac. R.R. v. Price, 360 U.S.
601, 609-10 (1959); Slocum v. Delaware, Lackawanna & W.R.R., 339 U.S. 239, 242
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effectuate these goals, it was considered essential that these grievances
be settled exclusively by the Adjustment Board, outside the court
system.7 6 The exclusive jurisdiction of the Board is justified by the
complexity and unique nature of railway contracts." The interpreta-
tion and application of such contracts is best left to the experience and
expertise of the management and labor representatives that comprise
the Board. 78 In compliance with these considerations, courts strictly
adhere to the NRAB's exclusive jurisdiction.
The minority courts, in requiring that all cases involving contrac-
tual interpretation be decided by the Adjustment Board, implicitly
suggest congressional preference for the Board's exclusive jurisdic-
tion. 79 Because they fail to recognize the countervailing policy con-
sideration of assuring a fair hearing for the employee, however, the
minority courts' handling of the issue is inadequate. A judicial deter-
mination of whether a particular claim involves contractual interpre-
tation bears no relation to whether an employee will receive a fair
hearing.
Whereas the minority courts fail to balance the competing interests,
the majority of courts balance the interests but fail to afford sufficient
weight to the fairness consideration. The majority courts permit an
employee to bring his claims against both the union and employer to
court only after the employee has demonstrated that he has been
effectively precluded from redress by the Board. 0 Implicit in this
standard is the belief that if an employee has the opportunity to bring
his claim before the Board, he will have a fair hearing. What these
courts fail to perceive is that a Board review of an employee's com-
plaint against his union and employer is inherently unfair.
(1950); Yawn v. Southern Ry., 591 F.2d 312, 314 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
934 (1979); Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. St. Johnsbury &
Lamoile County R.R., 512 F. Supp. 1079, 1083 (D. Vt. 1981).
76. Order of Ry. Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561, 565-66 (1946); Yawn v.
Southern Ry., 591 F.2d 312, 314 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 934 (1979); Taylor
v. Hudson Rapid Tubes Corp., 362 F.2d 748, 750-51 (3d Cir. 1966); see supra note
28 and accompanying text.
77. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 327 U.S. 661, 664-65 (1946); Taylor v.
Hudson Rapid Tubes, 362 F.2d 748, 750-51 (3d Cir. 1966); see Slocum v. Delaware,
Lackawanna & W.R.R., 339 U.S. 239, 243 (1950); Risher, supra note 9, at 74.
78. Gunther v. San Diego & A.E. Ry., 382 U.S. 257, 261-62 (1965); Union Pac.
R.R. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601, 614 (1959); Slocum v. Delaware, Lackawanna &
W.R.R., 339 U.S. 239, 243-44 (1950); Order of Ry. Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S.
561, 566 (1946); United Transp. Union v. Burlington N. Inc., 458 F.2d 354, 357 (8th
Cir. 1972); Diamond v. Terminal Ry. Ala. State Docks, 421 F.2d 228, 232-33 (5th
Cir. 1970).
79. Connor v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 496 F. Supp. 154, 157
(M.D. Pa. 1980); see Goclowski v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 571 F.2d 747, 755 (3d
Cir. 1977).
80. See supra notes 55-72 and accompanying text.
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An employee who petitions the Board faces a group of representa-
tives partisan in favor of their principals. The NRAB is composed of
an equal number of management and union members,8' with the
members of each group being paid by their respective organiza-
tions.812 In the typical situation-where a claimant is represented by
his union in a claim against his employer-union members vote as a
bloc in the employee's favor and management members vote against
him.8 3 Congress, in providing for a neutral referee to break these
frequent deadlocks, acknowledged the partisanship of the Board. 4
When an employee brings claims against both his employer and un-
ion, however, the management and union representatives are likely to
vote together and oppose the claims for self-serving purposes. In this
situation, the provision for a referee is of little assistance to the indi-
vidual claimant. The usual protection afforded a plaintiff by judicial
review is lacking as well. The RLA established, and courts adhere to,
81. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (a) (1976); H.R. Rep. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1934), reprinted in Senate Subcomm. on Labor, Comm. on Labor & Public Wel-
fare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of the Railway Labor Act, As Amended
918 (Comm. Print 1974).
82. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (g) (1976); see Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.,
393 U.S. 324, 327 (1969); H.R. Rep. No. 1944, 73cd Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934),
reprinted in Senate Subcomm. on Labor, Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of the Railway Labor Act, As Amended, 918
(Comm. Print 1974); Administration of the RLA, supra note 9, at 82.
83. See 112 Cong. Rec. H2749 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1966) (statement of Rep.
Younger), reprinted in Senate Subcomm. on Labor, Comm. on Labor & Public
Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of the Railway Labor Act, As
Amended 1355 (Comm. Print 1974); Northrup & Kahn, Railroad Grievance Machin-
ery: A Critical Analysis, 5 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 365, 368 (1952); Risher supra note
9, at 76; supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
84. H.R. Rep. No. 1944, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. 1 (1926), reprinted in Senate
Subcomm. on Labor, Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
Legislative History of the Railway Labor Act, As Amended 918 (Comm. Print 1974).
Commentators have uniformly recognized the partisanship of the Board, and the
rarity of cases that are decided without a referee. Risher, supra note 9, at 76
("overwhelming majority of cases are deadlocked by the parties and require the use
of a neutral referee"); Seidenberg, supra note 13, at 218, 219 ("carrier members...
insisted on deadlocking virtually every claim, regardless of its merits, and de-
mand[ed] that the services of a referee be invoked before any claim could be finally
deposed"); Preemption Doctrine, supra note 73, at 200 n.12 ("during the period
1965-1969, only 0.6% of the claims filed with the Third Division of the NRAB were
decided without the intervention of a referee to break the deadlock between the labor
and carrier members"). Several courts, however, have refused to acknowledge the
denial of a fair hearing at the NRAB due to the Board's makeup. These courts
maintain that Board members are judges, not advocates, and that they are therefore
impartial. Skidmore v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 619 F.2d 157, 159 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 854 (1980); Ferro v. Railway Express Agency, 296 F.2d 847,
852 (2d Cir. 1961); Sensabaugh v. Railway Express Agency Inc., 348 F. Supp. 1398,
1402 (W.D. Va. 1972); System Fed'n, No. 30 v. Braidwood, 284 F. Supp. 607, 610-
11 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
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a strict standard of judicial review that has been termed "among the
narrowest known to the law." s  A Board decision is therefore un-
likely to be reviewed and subsequently overturned. 83 Consequently,
any time an employee has claims against both his employer and
union, his chances for obtaining a fair hearing are, at best, minimal. s7
CONCLUSION
Because the individual is not as well-equipped as is the union to
bring a case before the NRAB, few cases are brought by an employee
representing himself. Even more infrequent is the instance when an
employee has a complaint joining his employer and union together in
a case that stems from the same facts. In view of the importance of an
impartial forum as balanced against the small number of claims that
would actually be involved, a proper interpretation of Glover's futility
exception would dictate that courts accept jurisdiction over all dis-
putes that involve both union and employer and stem from the same
set of facts. Such a result would protect the interests of the employee
and only minimally interfere with the jurisdiction of the NRAB.
Sandra Katz
85. Diamond v. Terminal Ry. Ala. State Docks, 421 F.2d 228, 233 (5th Cir.
1970); accord Union Pac. R.R. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 91 (1978) (per curiam): Del
Casal v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 634 F.2d 295, 298 (5th Cir.), cert. denied. 50
U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1981).
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